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INTRODUCTION
To space zealots, 1989 was the year the drought ended. The
space shuttle was operational again; Voyager's grand reconnaissance of the Solar System climaxed with the glorious encounter
with theplanetNeptuneandits startling moon, Triton; the launches
of the Magellan spacecraft to Venus and the Gallileo to Jupiter
broke a decade long ~iatus in the launch of U.S. planetary missions;
and, for the first time in over twenty years, a U.S. president
announced a daring new initiative in human exploration with the
goal of first returning humans to the Moon, then going on to Mars.
For awhile, it almost seemed like the sixties, again - a time
when the U.S. Space program was the greatest. Perhaps the spirit
of Apollo had returned to salve the painful wounds of the post
Challenger agony. But, as the balm brought healing, it also brought
soberness. We were entering the nineties, not the sixties. 1989's
successes notwithstanding, the nation faced difficult challenges,
the most aggravating of which was the national debt. The growing
commitment to contain the debt and the profusion of competing
budget interests would not allow the explosive growth of the Apollo
era. Competition from the Soviet Union no longer opened the
funding spigots and NASA itself, the custodian of the nation's space
destiny, still found itself mired in the inertia of an entrenched
bureaucracy. And, while the exploration of Mars and the outer solar
system excited the imagination, we began to realize that the threat
to the environment of our own planet Earth demanded that we focus
some of our space exploration efforts homeward. Nevertheless, the
catharsis of Challenger is yielding to a new, albeit bounded, optimism. Mars indeed beckons; Jupiter and Saturn and their moons
await the arrival of inquiring spacecraft; and the Moon will again
feel the footsteps of humans upon its surface.
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This lecture will attempt to take a realistic look at the U.S.
civil space program as it emerges from the pain of the post Challengeryears into an era of new hope and challenge. Tough decisions
must be made in a budget constrained environment. We may have
to find new ways of doing things, or we may have to rediscover old
ones. Perhaps a reexamination of "first principles" is in order. But,
if we do it right, the possibilities and opportunities extend beyond
our wildest imaginings.

mSTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
It is not the purpose of this lecture to conduct a detailed
historical review of the U.S. space program. However, there are
some key reference points that need to be identified and defined in
order to understand the landscape that confronts us. The reference
points essential to the thesis of this presentation divide the national
"space past" into three eras: (1) The Apollo era, (2) the preChallenger era, and (3) the post-Challenger era. Each of these eras
has been characterized by its own ambient spirit which strongly
influenced the planning and conduct of the space programs during
that era. That is not to say there has not been carry-over from one
era to another. The same NASA people have been on stage through
all three eras. The differences between the eras accompanied
changes in national space policy; the people both influenced those
changes and adjusted to conform to the new policy.

The Apollo Era
Radford Byerly, Jr., Director of the Center for Space and
Geosciences policy at the University of Colorado and a former .
member of the staff of the House of Representatives Subcommittee
on Space Science and Applications, characterizes the Apollo era as
a "can do" era during which "America had set out to put a human on
the Moon and NASA accomplished the task spectacularly well."
His definition of the "Apollo Paradigm" extends the vision beyond
the lunar landings to ".. an even broader vision; a beginning that
would lead to orbiting space stations, settlements on the Moon, and
colonies on Mars. America was destined to lead the human race into
space and it was NASA's job to do it." 1 An important footnote
should emphasize that the Apollo program was formulated at a time
of budget surplus, a phenomenon that most of us can hardly imagine
today.
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The Pre-Challenger Era
In its beginnings, the space shuttle era continued the vision
and enthusiasm of the Apollo era, but it was conducted under a
much more constricted budget climate. It competed with the
Vietnam War for national resources and attention. (The NASA
budget fell to about one-third of its Apollo peak.) The vision began
to fade as cost overruns and further budget pressures began to force
compromises in the development. Many feel that these pressures,
and NASA's reaction to them, set the stage for the Challenger
disaster a half a decade later.
Another factor clouding the vision was the lack of a fundamental objective associated with the space shuttle program, other
than the program itself. There was no extraterrestrial destination
-no Moon, no Mars. The official name of the program, the National
Space Transportation System, described a logistics element, not an
objective. The final product was to be an operational system to be
flown repetitiously to and from earth orbit. NASA was not organized for that type of task. As an agency, it was programmed for
singular missions which included a limited number of expendable
spacecraft. Worse still, the price of continuing the space shuttle
program included the cancellation of all other U.S. launch vehicle
programs. The space shuttle was to be the one and only means of
access to space. Perhaps, in this case, the vision exceeded reason.
For these and other reasons, the pre-Challenger space
shuttle era became one of confused goals and drifting priori ties. The
hard questions which should have been asked during this era were
not asked until after the Challenger accident.

The Post-Challenger Era
Almost no one can forget the circumstances surrounding
the Challenger explosion on January 28, 1986. That event will no
doubt be etched upon our memories for the rest of our lives. It has
also become a landmark event in the history of the nation's space
program, not just because of the tragic loss of the life, but also
because it signalled the end of the infallible image of NASA and the
nation's great adventure in space. Intense inquiry into the Challenger disaster expanded to a penetrating nvestigation of NASA
and the U.S. civil space program. Amid accusations of mismanage-
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ment and poor policymaking, the hard questions that should have
been asked earlier were asked, and, in many cases, the answers
were embarrassing. ''Why did the U.S. rely solely on the Shuttle?
Why are human crews used to launch communication satellites?
Why are science missions and the human spaceflight program tied
together? What is the rationale for the Station ?"2
Ifthere were some way to erase the human tragedy from the
Challenger accident, it could be considered a beneficial event. The
questions that flowed from the multitude of inquiries and investigations needed to be asked, and answers needed to be provided.
Changes were made and still more will be made. That tragedy
signalled the end of the space program's adolescence and an entry
into what hopefully will become a more mature program with well
defined, exhilarating goals, a program that will reestablish U.S.
leadership in those areas of space exploration that best fit the
national interest.

Planetary Exploration
Before leaving this brief journey through history, it would
be well to discuss the impacts of these events on the planetary
exploration program. There has been and will continue to be
endless debate on the relative merits of expensive human exploration programs versus exploration with highly automated, unmanned
spacecraft. There can be no argument that the funding allocated to
planetary exploration is inversely proportional to that awarded to
human exploration. Our euphoria at seeing the wonderful photographs of Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and the satellite
moons of these planets should be tempered with the realization that
these pictures were taken by spacecraft that were launched nearly
a decade before the Challenger disaster; and, until the Galileo and
Magellan launches in 1989, none had been launched since. NASA's
total commitment to the space shuttle program in an environment
of severe budget constraints nearly killed the planetary exploration
effort.

APPROACHING THE PRESENT
The National Commission on Space
Several significant events have occurred during the four
years following the Challenger accident that have strongly influ-
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enced the emergence of the still evolving posture of the current U.S.
space program. One of these , of course, is the national debt and the
limitations it places upon growth of new initiatives. The others are
equally significant, however, because they have been forged with a
clear knowledge of those debt constraints and have, to some degree,
attempted to fit within them.
In 1985 President Reagan asked the Congress to appoint a
National Commission on Space and charge them to "... formulate a
bold agenda to carry America's civilian space enterprise into the
21st century."3 Headed by Thomas O. Paine, a former NASA
Administrator, that commission traveled across the country for the
next year obtaining testimony from experts and citizens. They
concluded their report entitled, Pioneerin~ the Space Frontier, and
delivered it to Congress in May of 1986. Its delivery was almost
totally obscured by the nearly concurrent delivery of the Rogers
Commission report on the Challenger accident, but its comprehensive, imaginative, penetrating message could not stay buried long.
The report proposed three aggressive thrusts: "Advancing our
understanding of our planet, our Solar System, and the Universe;
Exploring, prospecting, and settling the Solar System; and Stimulating space enterprises for the direct benefit of the people on earth."
To accomplish these thrusts, the commission proposed two additional thrusts: "Advancing technology across a broad spectrum to
assure timely availability of critical capabilities and Creating and
operating systems and institutions to provide low-cost access to the
spacefrontier."4 The report outlined a methodical expansion of the
space infrastructure from low-earth orbit to Mars and beyond over
a fifty year period, while postulating that commitment to such a
long-term program could be carried out within known budget constraints.

The "Sally Ride" Report
Required by Congress to respond to the report of the
National Commission on Space, NASA appointed Dr. Sally K Ride,
a former astronaut,. to head a select NASA group to formulate a
reply. Entitled, LEADERSHIP and America's Future in Space, that
report quickly established itself as an extremely competent reference document for all future discussions of future U.S. space
program initiatives. Noting that the reviews following the Challenger accident revealed the shortcomings of the national space pro-
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gram and raised serious questions concerning U.S. leadership
among spacefaring nations, the "Sally Ride Report" stated that,
''The U.S. civilian space program is now at a crossroads, aspiring
toward the visions of the National Commission on Space but faced
with the realities set forth by the Rogers Commission. NASA must
respond aggressively to the challenges of both while recognizing the
necessity of maintaining a balanced space program within reasonable fiscal limits." It further noted that, ''Two fundamental, potentially inconsistent views have emerged. Many people believe that
NASA should adopt a major, visionary goal. They argue that this
would galvanize support, focus NASA programs, and generate excitement. Many others believe that NASA is already overcommitted in the 1990s; they argue that the space agency will be struggling
to operate the Space Shuttle and build the Space Station, and could
not handle another major program."5
The Ride Report cuts to the heart of the dilemma facing the
U.S. space program today, but it meets the dilemma head-on by
reemphasizing the need for a long-range direction based upon
clearly defined goals. It notes that, " ...ifthere are no goals, or if the
goals are too diffuse, then there is no focus to the program and no
framework for decisions. The goals of the civilian space program
must be carefully chosen to be consistent with the national interest
and also to be consistent with NASA's capabilities ...Without an eye
to the future, we flounder in the present." In what may be its most
quoted statement, the report then states that, "Leadership in space
does not require -that the U.S. be preeminent in all areas of space
enterprise. The widening range of space activities and the increasing number of spacefaring nations make it virtually impossible for
any country to dominate in this way. It is, therefore, essential for
America to move promptly to determine its priorities and to pursue
a strategy which would restore and sustain its leadership in the
areas deemed important."6
The Ride Report then describes a process for the development of strategic options which can then be matched at various
levels to national interests. The outcome of the process should,be a
national space strategy that is directed toward establishing U.S.
leadership in those areas which best match the national interest.
Although the process doesn't make the hard questions any easier,
it does establish a systematic, logical way to arrive at answers
which are weighed against a framework of established national
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policy. To activate the process, the report proposes four bold
initiatives for "definition, study and evaluation". The study doesn't
propose that anyone or combination of these initiatives be adopted
in its entirety; rather, it proposes that national strategic options be
developed that combine various aspects of each initiative. Intense
evaluation of the strategic options should then lead to a national
space policy which provides goals for the future that match national
interests and policy. The referenced initiatives are "Mission to
Planet Earth, Exploration of the Solar System, Outpost on the
Moon, and Humans to Mars".7
Foouation of the Office of Exploration
Duringthe preparation of the Ride Report NASA decided to
organize a separate office to begin to develop the strategic options
to be presented to the NASA Administrator and, eventually, the
President for their consideration formulating a national space
policy. Dr. Sally Ride became the first Associate Administrator for
Exploration. Soon after the completion of the report, she-retired and
is now associated with the Hoover Institute at Stanford University.
Since the publication of the Ride Report, the Office of
Exploration has published several studies and reports on the
progress of their development and evaluation of strategic options.
While these reports have been widely read within NASA, other
events seem to be overtaking these studies. Most recently, the
Office of Exploration was combined with NASA's Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology to form a new Office of Aeronautics and
Exploration Technology. The influence of this office on the formulation of the nation's future space program is yet to be determined.
The Reagan Space Policy
On two occasions President Ronald Reagan attempted to
formally establish national space policy. In August of 1984, he
approved a new National Space Strategy which ".. .implements a
series of space initiatives including examination of new military
and civil space vehicles beyond the space shuttle and efforts that
could place the U.S. on course for a return to the Moon and possible
manned flight to Mars."8
It directed NASAto make the Space
Transportation System (space shuttle) "fully operational and costeffective in providing routine access to space." It also directed
NASA to develop a permanently manned Space Station within a
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decade and identify major long-range national goals for the civil
space program. There were few guidelines given for the development of those goals.9 Note that this strategy was issued before the
Challenger explosion.
On January 8, 1986, President Reagan issued a new Presidential Directive on National Space Policy, following a comprehensive and lengthy review by the Interagency Group for Space (lGSpace). Membership in the IG-Space included representatives from
the National Security Council, Department of State , Department of
Defense, Department of Commerce, Department of Transportation,
Treasury Department, CIA, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, NASA, OMB, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy.
The review included a comprehensive focus on the report of the
National Commission on Space, the Ride Report, and other applicable documents dealing with the commercial aspects of space. The
new policy was significant in its specific attention to all aspects of
the U.S. space program - military, civil and commercial. It was
met with general enthusiasm, although it was criticized for its
failure to provide quantifiable, prioritized goals and timetables.
Wirin points out, for example, that, "The policy gives everybody
everything and makes few, if any, hard choices ... .In fact, the biggest
disappointment with the new policy is its failure to set a major goal
before the American people and call for action."10
Po s sib 1y
the most dramatic aspect of the new policy was its call to expand
human presence and activity beyond Earth orbit into the Solar
System. This goal is especially significant for three reasons. First,
U.S. space policy has articulated a specific position on manned
versus unmanned exploration of space. Second, it established a
funded program, project Pathfinder, to develop the technology for
human exploration, and third it brought focus to the to the poten tial
for a human expedition to Mars.11
Formation of the National Space Council
Upon assuming the Presidency in January, 1989, President
Bush made good on a campaign promise to form a National Space
Council to be responsible for the formulation of a national space
policy and the acquisition of the means to pursue it. Chaired by the
Vice President, the membership of the council includes representatives from other cabinet offices as well as NASA. What makes this
event significant is that NASA is no longer the agency soley
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responsible for formulating and gaining approval for the nation's
space program. NASA still has a substantial role to play in those
activities, butitis only one of several players. Some have suggested
that NASA may not. even be the sole implementer of the program.
Defense Department drawdowns will possibly relieve the National
Laboratories (e.g. Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore) of some of
their workload, freeing up valuable national talent for work on the
space program. Itis interesting to note that the U.S. had a National
Space Council during the Apollo era. It was disbanded by President
Nixon along with the Apollo program.

The Bush Space Policy
On the twentieth anniversary of man's first footsteps on the
Moon (July 20, 1989), President George Bush formally declared the
national goal of returning humans to the Moon and mounting a human expedition to Mars. President Bush didn't claim that this
policy was a ew one - rather, it was an implementation of the
preceding Reagan policy. Although his policy was criticized for its
lack of a timetable or budget, Bush assigned the responsibility for
providing those items to his newly created National Space Council.
That body has aggressively accepted that assignment and is very
much in the midst of that planning. All of which brings us to the
present.

OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND ISSUES
Opportunities
An excellent summary of the opportunities confronting
national space program strategists is presented in the Ride Report,
LEADERSHIP and America's Future in Space. This document
groups those opportunities under the four "Leadership" initiatives
described earlier and discusses each in detail. This grouping
facilitates the development of strategy options for evaluation and!
or implementation.

The first initiative, "Mission to Planet Earth," can almost be
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considered an imperative rather than an option. Growing concern
over global change and its effects on the quality of life on the earth
is increasingly demanding aggressive actions to measure, analyze,
and understand that change. The Ride Report proposes: (l)"To
establish and maintain a global observational system in space,
which would include experiments and free-flying platforms, in
polar, low-inclination, and geostationary orbits, and which would
perform integrated, long-term measurements." and (2)"To use the
data from these satellites along with in-situ information and
numerical modeling to document, understand, and eventually predict
global change."12
The second initiative, "Exploration of the Solar System," is
based upon the strategy developed by the Solar System Exploration
Committee of the NASA Advisory Council. The proposed programs
include the Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby (CRAF) mission to
investigate the beginnings of the Solar System; the Cassini mission
to explore Saturn and its largest moon, Titan; and the Mars Rover/
Sample Return mission to gather samples from the surface of Mars
and return them to earth.13
The third initiataive, "Outpost on the Moon," proposes a
three phase evolutionary effort to provide permanent human habitation on the Moon. "By 2010, up to 30 people would be productively
living and working on the lunar surface for months at a time .... This
initiative represents a conceptual leap outward from Earth. The
challenge is to tame and harness the space frontier - to go beyond
Apollo, and explore the Moon for what it can tell us, and what it can
offer us, as a research and development center and as a resource in
itself. [It] would represen t a significan t extraterrestrial step toward
learning to live and work in the hostile environments of other
worlds."14
The final initiative, "Humans to Mars," seems to be the
ultimate of initiatives. The President's policy statement included
an admonishment that we are not to go for brief explore-and-return
visits. The eventual goal is the establishment of a permanent
presence on the surface. The scenario begins with comprehensive
robotic exploration missions in the 1990s. Concurrently, an aggressive life sciences research program would be conducted on the Space
Station to investigate and validate the feasibility oflong-term space
flight. Finally, sprint type, one-year piloted missions would be con-
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ducted as precursors to the establishment of permanent outposts.
As the Ride Report states, ''This leadership initiative declares
America's intention to continue exploring Mars, and to do so not
only with spacecraft and rovers, but also with humans. It would
clearly rekindle the national pride and prestige enjoyed by the U.S.
during the Apollo era. Humans to Mars would be a great national
adventure; as such, it would require a concentrated massive national commitment - a commitment to a goal and its supporting
science, technology, and infrastructure for many decades."15
Challenges
Two severe challenges face the U.S. space program in the
future; both deal with resources. The first, and most severe, is the
budget. The pursuit of any combination of the Ride initiatives will
require real increases in the NASA budget. This fact conflicts with
the goals of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Reaffirmation Act of 1987 - the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.
That act" ... will require some combination of reduced spending or increased taxes that lowers the annual federal deficit to zero by 1993."
If each year's deficit target is not reached, across-the-board reductions are required. However, seventy-five percent of the budget is
exempt and unavailable for cutting. The NASA budget is part of the
remaining twenty-five percent. "Put another way, under current
law, NASA's less than one percent offederal spending becomes four
percent of the pie in the event that the sequester knife is applied."16
The other resource challenge is concerned with trained
people. As we enter the decade of the 1990s, much of the experienced
NASA and space industrial workforce is eligible and ready for
retirement. From one viewpoint, this might be alright. The space
agency and its industrial support system need new blood to begin
.the marvelous adventure. The real problem lies in the ability of the
supply to meet the demand. The decline in the interest in mathematics and science among American youth during the past decade
foreshadows a real shortage in scientific and engineering talent.
Ironically, it was the Apollo era that generated a tremendous
increased emphasis and interest in those areas during the decades
of the 60s and 70s. The crucial questions are: Can the great
challenge and adventure of an aggressive space program rekindle
that interest and emphasis? and Is it too late for the supply to meet
the currently emerging demand?
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It's interesting that the principle challenges to the nation's
future space program are resource related. Certainly there are
tremendous technical challenges. We need large capacity propulsion systems that are capable of thrusting payloads into space that
are enormous by today's standards. The damaging effects on
humans of prolonged weightlessness must be understood and overcome. Closed-cycle life support habitats for long-term space flight
and life on planetary surfaces must be developed. Automated!
expert systems for the robotic exploration of the Moon, Mars and the
outer planets are needed. The list goes on. But, one legacy of the
tremendous technical explosion that began in the middle part of this
century is the attitude that if resources are available, technical
problems can be solved. If there is enough in the budget and if
technical people are available, the technical challenges can be
overcome.

Issues
The primary focus of this presentation to this point has been
at the goal level of the national space program, but it is clear that
controversies don't end when the goals have been established, even
if a basic consensus regarding the goals exists. Issues over the
implementation of the goals will persist. Some of these can be
resolved within a reasonable period. Others will persist seemingly
forever. It is important to understand some of these issues because
a growing consensus on the future goals of the national space
program is now causing the focus of attention to shift to these tough
Issues.

Manned yersus unmanned systems/subsystems.
Competition between of manned and unmanned space systems has
existed since the beginnings of the space program. The focus of the
conflict is, of course, resources; the dilemma is classic. "Utilitarian
arguments in support of piloted space flight are difficult, if not
impossible, to support in a limited cost-benefit analysis. Human
presence is expensive and automated substitutes abound in most
proven applications of space technology .... Yet, in the public perception, the NASA program is equated with human space flight and it
is a program attribute for which there is a willingness to pay."17
Historically, the development and deployment of human operated
systems has inevitably drawn resources away from unmanned

12

programs. This was especially true during the development of the
space shuttle. Consistent overruns in a climate of drastically
reduced budgets required NASA to withdraw funds from other
programs; and, the unmanned science programs suffered. The
pathetic story of the Galileo mission presents a vivid example of this
conflict. (See Murray, Journey into Space, The First Thirty Years
of Space Exploration) 18

It seems that the issue can only be resolved by clearly
defining a strategy that specifically sets the roles and priorities for
manned and unmanned exploration. One author has suggested
that the unmanned planetary exploration program could be protected by somehow deciding "... how much we the people are prepared to invest each year in exploring the solar system. With a
stable budget, scientists can layout a plan for the systematic
exploration of the planets. Such a plan has been put forward by the
Space Science Board. Such a program would be pursued with a clear
understanding that its overruns would simply delay the program,
not tax others."19

j

The Space Station Freedom. In 1984 President Reagan
committed the nation to the development, fabrication and deployment of an international space station to insure a permanent
human presence in space. Since that day, the program has been
batted back and forth in an intense controversy between its advocates and detractors. The U.S. Congress provided the arena for the
nearly constant debate during endless budget hearings. An abundance of grist is provided by continuously upgraded cost estimates,
program alterations to meet budget constraints, unhappiness of
international partners, and a lack of consensus on functions and
missions. The program sometimes seems like an anachronistic
remnant of the pre-Challenger era. It, too, is a logistics element, an
outpost without a clearly defined objective to support. It has
alternatively been justified as a laboratory for the conduct ofmicrogravity experiments, a staging base for expeditions to the Moon and
Mars, a research facility for the study of long-term microgravity
effects on humans, a platform for earth observing instruments, etc.
Serious questions about the Space Station's ability to adequately
serve any of these needs have continually been debated since its beginnings. These debates are conducted both out of the public eye in
technical and scientific forums and very much in the public eye in
the halls of Congress. The result has been a continuing reduction
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in size and capability. Ensuing compromises in the Station's ability
to support any of the postulated missions continue to fuel the
debate.
There are alternatives to the Space Station Freedom. They
include international cooperative arrangements with the Soviet
Union for use of the Soviet Mir space station for shared research on
the effects oflongterm weightlessness on humans and the construction of "man-tended" systems for the conduct of microgravity research.20 The utility of the current Space Station configuration for
the on-orbit assembly of large interplanetary launch systems has
yet to be proven. Perhaps such operations could be conducted with
the space shuttle and its follow-on configurations.

It is unlikely that Space Station debate will be concluded in
the near term. Although there is some sign of growing uneasiness
among advocates, the momentum of the program and the reluctance to abandon international agreements will likely insure its
continuance. Additional cost problems will be resolved by further
reductions in capability. Only time will reveal the eventual configuration.
Scale. The history of the U.S. space program has seen
continual growth in an institutional commitment to very large
space systems. In its early days, the lack of a heavy-lift launch
capability forced NASA to build small spacecraft with limited
capabilities. These spacecraft were usually built in pairs to provide
redundancy in case offailure. Illustrative are the Mariner, Viking,
Pioneer, and Voyager series of spacecraft. More recently, however,
this philosophy has given way to one featuring single, very large,
very costly, multimission spacecraft. Arguments supporting this
philosophy include economy of scale (It is cheaper to share common
spacecraft utilities such as power, attitude control, communications, etc.) and pooling of requirements (The more requirements
that can be met, the greater the constituency supporting the
mission.).21

Although these arguments may have some validity, they
must be weighed against serious counterarguments. There is a sort
of"Magi not Line" effect that resul ts in the loss of an en tire combined
scientific effort, not to mention a tremendous investment, with the
loss of a single system. For example, NASA's currently proposed
Earth Observation System is a $30 billion program which includes
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two series of large polar platforms (EOS-A and EOS-B) supporting
multiple complementary payloads.22 While the goal, comprehensive support of the Mission to Planet Earth initiative, is noble, the
size and cost of this sin~le program equals or exceeds that of the
Space Station. Its size and complexity make it vulnerable to the
budget cutting process, compromises in competing scientific requirements, and in-flight failures. Any system includes some
similar vulnerabilities but the singular nature of large, complex
systems makes their vulnerabilities potentially fatal.
Institutional space planners (NASA, DOD, the National
Space Council) need to seriously consider a strategy which concentrates on the use of constellations of small, single-mission spacecraft to accomplish missions in support of national space objectives.
Such a strategy incorporates a robustness growing from redundancy, which reduces vulnerability. Reductions in the budget
would reduce numbers of satellites but would not threaten the
entire system; competitive compromises would be eliminated in
favor of spacecraft tailored to support each individual mission; and
in-flight failures would result in the loss of a single sensor, not the
entire mission.

International cOQperation. A strong initiative for international cooperation among space faring nations, particularly the
Unites States and the Soviet Union, has been vigorously promoted
for the past several years by a group of notable space scientists, including Dr. Carl Sagan and Dr. Bruce Murray. The advantages of
international cooperative efforts are argued on aesthetic, technical,
and practical grounds. A SovietJAmerican cooperative mission to
Mars, for example, would involve commitments by both nations to
a transcendent goal that would eventually eliminate the tensions
arising from conflicts over relatively petty political differences.
Cost sharing in such an expensive mission makes its eventuality
more certain. The sharing of technological strengths eliminates the
need for duplicate technological developments. (It seems silly, for
example, for the U.S. to mount a massive effort to develop heavylift launch vehicle for a Mars mission when the Soviet Energia is
already sufficient.)
Arguments against international cooperation center primarily on the risks of technology transfer. Opposition ranges from
absolute resistance to any cooperative efforts to an agreement with
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the concept as long as proper safeguards are installed to insure
against the transfer of "critical" technology. In a very significant
move to resolve the issue, the Bush administration recently announced plans to open discussions with the Soviet Union, Japan,
Canada, and the Europeans regarding international cooperative
efforts leading to the establishment of a lunar base and a mission to
Mars. The National Space Council has been asked to establish
guidelines for such talks.23
On!anizational resnonsibilities. The creation of the
National Space Council has established a focal point for the development of national space policy and the setting of national space
priorities. The N a~ional Space Council is not an implementing
agency, but it can serve to coordinate the actions of implementing
agencies in the execution of space policy. Although NASA should
still serve as the principle implementing agency for U.S . space
programs, other agencies, notably the National Laboratories, should
also participate. Such participation cannot be expected to always
produce harmony; some competitive conflict should be anticipated.
However, if the Space Council is able to meet its charter, it should
be able to productively manage such conflict. An important current
example concerns the planning for the "MoonlMars Initiative,"
officially entitled the Human Exploration Initiative (HE!). NASA's
"90 Day Plan" for HEI has been subjected to serious scrutiny both
within and without the National Space Council. The Council has
solicited private and public inputs to the plan, even reaching out to
individual Americans for suggestions on innovative approaches to
the MoonlMars missions. A competing proposal "... to explore the
Moon and Mars quickly and inexpensively but with relatively high,
Apollo-level risks ... " has been promoted by Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratories. The debate has been joined. Ifits managed
properly, it could be a productive one.24
CONCLUSIONS

When one really stops to think about the possibility of
landing humans on the surface of Mars and all the fascinating
aspects of permanent Martian colonies, it truly seems beyond the
imagination. Some of us still look at the Moon and wonder that man
actually set foot on that planetary surface. And yet, we honestly do
stand on the brink of an exploration adventure that transcends any
ever attempted by man. There's no question about our technical
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ability to do it. The real questions deal with our ability to devise the
plans and programs to take us there in an affordable fashion. Such
plans and programs will require a long-term commitment to a longterm program. Americans are not particularly good at that.
In order to reach the objectives of the tremendous adventure ahead, we must be able to devise a program that combines a
number of elements into an infrastructure that secures ultimate
success. We must, for example, insure that the Space Station
becomes an integral part of that infrastructure, not an element that
drives it. A balance between manned and unmanned systems and
subsystems must be devised that reduces human risk by automating functions wherever possible. Tradeoffs between and scale and
complexity need to be seriously conducted with cautious concerns
for past institutional biases. International cooperation needs to be
examined for the great potential opportunities it offers and national
and international organizational responsibilities must be clearly
defined.
In pursuing the Mars dream, we must also remember that
the Solar System includes many more bodies that need to be
explored. Exploration of the outer planets will not be done by
humans. We must insure a balance in the nation's space program
that includes a "fenced" budget for unmanned planetary exploration.
Despite its questionable ability to support all the needs it
claims to support, the Space Station Freedom can be useful in the
conduct of research on the effects of long-term weightlessness on
humans in preparation for the lengthy missions to Mars. Serious
attention to its role in the assembly oflunar and Mars bound launch
vehicles must be paid early in order to insure the incorporation of
design features necessary to facilitate that mission.
The U.S. institutional commitment to single, large, expensive space vehicles must be seriously reexamined. This presentation doesn't claim that small spacecraft offer a panacea; it simply
suggests that the redundancy, resiliency, and flexibility of cons tellations of small spacecraft strongly support a serious reexamination of present directions.
Finally, the opportunity for international cooperation is too
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good to reject. No doubt cooperative programs will open up a whole
new set of challenges, but there is validity to the view that cooperation with each other on such a grand mission will inevitably transfer
the conflicts from their current concentration on mutual annihilation. Furthermore, we can't afford to go it alone. The sharing of
resources, the elimination of technology duplication, and the use of
one another's assets and facilities are all good reasons to pursue
such a course.
We have emerged from the Challenger disaster a wiser,
more mature nation. Our goals are still intact. In fact, they are
better defined now than ever before. Implementation strategies
still need to be worked out and technology needs to be developed, but
we'll make it. And, it will be a grand adventure.
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